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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - THE "GRAPE" MARCH ON W ASH­
INGTON: THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT, THE DORMANT COM­
MERCE CLAUSE, AND DIRECT ALCOHOL SHIPMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The convergence of two modern phenomena - the Internet 
and the popularity of drinking and collecting wine - have resulted 
in a constitutional controversy that has reached six United States 
Circuits and will now be resolved by the United States Supreme 
CourU The controversy arises out of state laws that ban the direct­
shipment of alcohol to consumers to varying degrees.2 The consti­
tutionality of these laws hinges on the relationship between the 
Twenty-First Amendment3 and the Commerce Clause.4 When 
states were granted the power to regulate alcohol transportation or 
importation through ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment,S 
1. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004); Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 
517 (6th Cir. 2003); Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003); Beskind v. Easley, 
325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002); 
Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000). Both the Heald and 
Swedenburg cases were appealed to the United States Supreme Court. A petition for a 
writ of certiorari was granted in both cases on May 24, 2004 and the cases were consoli­
dated. The question has been limited to the following: "Does a State's regulatory 
scheme that permits in-state wineries directly to ship alcohol to consumers but restricts 
the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so violate the dormant Commerce Clause in 
light of Sec. 2 of the 21st Amendment?" 72 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. 2004). 
2. The legislative landscape has changed dramatically; only ten years ago just four 
states allowed interstate direct-shipments. Twenty-six states now allow direct-ship­
ments, although twenty-four still have prohibitions. Shipping directly to consumers has 
also been made a felony in several states. Free the Grapes!, at http:// 
www.freethegrapes.com/research.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). See infra notes 110­
123 and accompanying text. 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 ("The transportation or importation into any 
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxi­
cating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."). 
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3. This section states that Congress has the power 
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes." Id. 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. See supra note 3. 
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many direct-shipment bans were passed by state legislatures.6 Sub­
sequently, in-state exemptions were added, and now these laws 
have been challenged through lawsuits7 in which plaintiffs argue 
that direct-shipment laws interfere with interstate commerce and 
therefore violate the Commerce Clause.8 The defendant states re­
spond by arguing that the Twenty-First Amendment grants them 
the right to regulate alcohol shipments despite the Commerce 
Clause. They believe that the Amendment has granted them this 
power so that they can create legislation that promotes temperance, 
implement taxation and regulate market conditions. Specifically, 
the states argue that the Twenty-First Amendment creates a consti­
tutional exception to the Commerce Clause. 
Since 2000, six federal circuits have reviewed the constitution­
ality of laws banning the direct-shipment of out-of-state alcohol to 
consumers, four of them in 2003 and 2004.9 It is not difficult to 
understand why there is so much interest and activity in this area of 
the law. Unlike many legal issues that affect only small groups of 
people, this issue affects everyone from large corporations to small 
business owners, and from the wealthy wine collector to the casual 
6. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-102.1, 18B-109, 18B-1114, 18B-102 passed in 
1937 by North Carolina and TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 107.07(a), 107.07(f) 
passed in 1935 by Texas. 
7. See supra note l. 
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See supra note 4. 
9. Sweden burg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004); Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 
517 (6th Cir. 2003); Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003); Beskind v. Easley, 
325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002); 
Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000). These cases have also 
generated a great deal of law review attention and several organizations have formed 
for the purpose of lobbying for one side or the other. See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, 
Direct-shipment of Wine, the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment: A Call 
for Legislative Reform, 37 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2004); Brannon P. Denning, Smokey and 
the Bandit in Cyberspace: The Dormant Commerce Clause, The Twenty-First Amend­
ment, and State Regulation of Internet Alcohol Sales, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 297 (2002); 
Susan Lorde Martin, Wine Wars-Direct Shipment of Wine: The Twenty-First Amend­
ment, The Commerce Clause, and Consumers' Rights, 38 AM. Bus. L. J. 1 (2000); An­
drew J. Kozusko, III, Note and Comment, The Fight to "Free the Grapes" Enters Federal 
Court: Constitutional Challenges to the Validity of State Prohibitions on the Direct-ship­
ment of Alcohol, 20 J.L. & COM. 75 (2000); James Molnar, Comment, Under the Influ­
ence: Why Alcohol Direct-shipment Laws Are a Violation of the Commerce Clause, 9 U. 
MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 169 (2001); Matthew J. Patterson, Note, A Brewing Debate: Alco­
hol Direct-shipment Laws and the Twenty-First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 761 
(2002); Jason E. Prince, Note, New Wine in Old Wineskins: Analyzing State Direct-Ship­
ment Laws in the Context of Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the 
Twenty-First Amendment, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1563 (2004); Coalition for Free 
Trade, at http://www.coalitionforfreetrade.com (last visited Sept. 4, 2004); Free the 
Grapes!, at http://www.freethegrapes.com (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). 
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wine drinker. 10 
Part I of this Note examines the jurisprudence of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, as well as the history surrounding the Twenty­
First Amendment and the alcohol direct-shipment laws that are be­
ing challenged. Part II examines the six circuit decisions concerning 
state direct-shipment laws. Two circuit splits have been created 
through these decisions. The first circuit split involves the constitu­
tionality of the direct-shipment laws themselves; the second circuit 
split concerns the selection of an appropriate remedy if a court 
finds that a direct-shipment law is unconstitutional. The remedial 
debate focuses on the distinction between courts that chose to 
strike down the shipment bans in their entirety, and courts that 
have chosen narrower alternatives. Finally, Part III analyzes the 
issue of whether the Supreme Court should strike down these laws 
as violative of the Dormant Commerce Clause. In this context, the 
proper balance between the two conflicting constitutional provi­
sions will be analyzed. This Note proposes that the United States 
Supreme Court should respect the clear intent behind the Twenty­
First Amendment and treat it as a constitutional exception to the 
Commerce Clause, thereby permitting states to regulate in what 
would otherwise be a discriminatory fashion. Such a result pre­
serves the integrity of the amendment process as well as the clear 
precedent of the Court itself. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause states that "Congress shall have power 
[t]o regulate commerce ... among the several states."ll This 
clause has been read to grant Congress the power to regulate com­
merce, and has also been judicially interpreted "as imposing some 
self-executing limitations on the scope of permissible state regula­
tion. "12 The constitutional principle that states are limited in the 
ways that they can affect interstate commerce is commonly referred 
to as the "Dormant" Commerce Clause. "The dormant commerce 
10. Interestingly, this issue has even caused a division in the "conservative legal 
establishment" - former independent counsel Kenneth Starr is assisting Michigan con­
sumers, while former Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork is representing wholesalers. 
See Anne Gearan, U.S. Supreme Court says Wine Import Fight Is Ripe for a Ruling, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 24, 2004, available at http://www.freep.com. 
11. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3. 
12. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.1, 309 
(6th ed. 2000). 
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clause is meant to prevent the various states from imposing eco­
nomic protectionism" through passing laws that would favor their 
own economic interests.13 If one state passes a law that discrimi­
nates against another state, retaliatory legislation would likely re­
sult, and the national economy would be seriously affected.14 The 
Supreme Court has thus "construed the Commerce Clause as incor­
porating an implicit restraint on state power even in the absence of 
congressional action."15 To hold otherwise would contradict the 
plan the framers of the Constitution had for a national economy.16 
One of the reasons the Articles of Confederation failed was be­
cause of the destructive trade wars the states waged with one an­
other; the Framers sought to avoid this with the new Constitution.17 
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has evolved through 
nearly two hundred years of Supreme Court decisions. IS Although 
modern Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has only materi­
alized since the 1930s, the Court has consistently allowed states to 
regulate for the health and safety of their residents if the burden on 
13. Id. at 310. 
14. Id. 
15. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2, 1030 (3d ed. 
2000). 
16. See THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton). In this essay, Hamilton 
continues his discussion of taxation and money in the new nation. Although he ac­
knowledges the rights of states to levy and collect taxes, Hamilton points out that the 
states retain the sovereignty they formerly had so long as the power had not been "ex­
clusively delegated to the United States." Id. at 241. He further states that "there has 
been the most pointed care in those cases where it was deemed improper that the like 
authorities should reside in the States, to insert negative clauses prohibiting the exercise 
of them by the States." !d. at 244. Thus, it is logical to look to the Commerce Clause as 
not only granting power to Congress, but also concurrently restricting the power of the 
states. 
17. TRIBE, supra note 15 § 6-3, at 1044 (2000). 
18. The earliest of these cases include Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 
How.) 299 (1851) and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See also, e.g., 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (Arizona fruit packaging requirements 
held unconstitutional for placing an undue burden on interstate commerce without suf­
ficient justification for protecting Arizona growers); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 
359 U.S. 520 (1959) (Court found Illinois statute regulating truck mudflaps to be uncon­
stitutional because the burden on interstate commerce substantially outweighed any 
value as a safety measure); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (city 
ordinance requiring pasteurization within a five mile radius found unconstitutional be­
cause there were reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives to serve the city's inter­
ests); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (Arizona law restricting the length of 
trains found unconstitutional because the benefit of the law as a safety measure did not 
outweigh the burden on interstate commerce); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 
How.) 299 (1851) (Pennsylvania law requiring ships entering or leaving Philadelphia 
port to use a local pilot was upheld because the state may regulate if there is a pecu­
liarly local concern involved). 
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commerce is minimal, while at the same time prohibiting the states 
from truly interfering with commerce.19 Specifically, in Baldwin v. 
G.A.P. Seelig, Inc., the Court decided that a state could not use its 
power to protect the health and safety of its citizens by engaging in 
economic protectionism and projecting its legislation into another 
state.20 This standard is especially pertinent in the direct-shipment 
arena. Typically, 
[i]f there is discrimination, then it must appear that there is no 
other reasonable method of safeguarding a legitimate local inter­
est. If a state law has no other purpose than to favor local indus­
try, this balancing of interest approach should not be used, 
because the purpose of the state regulation would be 
illegitimate.21 
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence began with the case 
of Gibbons v. Ogden in 1824.22 In that case, the Court found it 
unconstitutional for New York to grant a steamboat monopoly to 
Ogden, because federally-licensed Gibbons was prohibited from 
operating in New York waters.23 This case was the first to describe 
the "negative" aspect of the Commerce Clause; Chief Justice Mar­
shall stated that if a state regulates interstate commerce, "it is exer­
cising the very power that is granted to [C]ongress and is doing the 
very thing which [C]ongress is authorized to do."24 The early Com­
merce Clause cases were decided in large part on the distinction 
between "commerce" and "police" regulations; this would change 
in the mid-Nineteenth century.25 
The next major development occurred in 1851 with Cooley v. 
Board of Wardens;26 here, the Court determined that the state may 
regulate interstate commerce if there was a peculiarly local concern 
involved. However, the Court did not establish what distinguished 
a national concern from a "peculiarly local" concern. In this case, 
19. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (New York's refusal to 
grant license to operate to a Massachusetts milk distributor found unconstitutional be­
cause the provision was not to promote health and safety, but instead to prohibit 
competition ). 
20. 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (holding New York laws requiring milk dealers in the 
state to pay minimum prices in order to be licensed, whether or not milk was bought in 
New York or elsewhere, unconstitutional on the ground that New York did not have the 
power to project its legislation into another state and set a barrier to commerce). 
21. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12 §8.8, at 329. 
22. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
23. [d. 
24. [d. at 10. 
25. TRIBE, supra note 15 §6-4, at 1046 (2000). 
26. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
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the Court permitted Pennsylvania to require ships to use local pilots 
when entering or leaving Philadelphia; this was held to be accept­
able because a local subject was being regulated as opposed to a 
national one.27 Although the Court recognized that this state law 
affected interstate commerce, the Court chose to look to what was 
being regulated, as opposed to the motivations behind the law.28 
Eventually, the Court decided that merely looking at the na­
ture of the regulated subject was insufficient; instead, laws needed 
to be evaluated in light of their burden on interstate commerce, and 
whether or not that burden was direct or indirect in its effect on 
interstate commerce.29 The Court stated in Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc. that "[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate 
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate com­
merce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden im­
posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits."30 
Under the modern analysis that has evolved since the mid­
1930s, the first level of analysis for a statute is determining that it 
concerns a legitimate state end.31 However, even with a legitimate 
end, a statute is virtually per se invalid if it discriminates against 
interstate commerce and has no other purpose but to serve local 
economic interests.32 In addition, the standard emerged that if 
there are reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives available to 
serve local interests, a law will be unconstitutional.33 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 316. See also South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 
Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). 
29. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (Court found Illinois 
statute regulating truck mudflaps to be unconstitutional because the burden on inter­
state commerce substantially outweighed any value as a safety measure); Southern Pa­
cific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (Arizona law restricting length of trains found 
unconstitutional because the benefit of the law as a safety measure did not outweigh the 
burden on interstate commerce); DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927) (Penn­
sylvania law requiring steamboat ticket sellers to have a license was struck down as an 
unnecessary and burdensome interference with interstate commerce). See also TRIBE, 
supra note 15 §6-4, at 1049. 
30. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
31. TRIBE, supra note 15 §6-5, at 1050 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 
644 (1982)). 
32. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); 
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). See supra note 18. Also, it is im­
portant to note that even if a statute does not discriminate against interstate commerce, 
it may still be struck down if the burden on interstate commerce exceeds the local bene­
fits. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
33. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 329 (1951) (city ordinance requir­
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In more recent cases, the current Justices have generally stated 
that discriminatory statutes will be struck down unless they can be 
justified by something other than economic protectionism.34 Great 
emphasis has been placed on the discriminatory nature of the regu­
lations in question.35 The Court has plainly stated that "[i]f a re­
striction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se 
invalid."36 At times, the Court has "articulated the test for discrim­
inatory state regulations as requiring invalidation 'unless the dis­
crimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to 
economic protectionism."'37 However, the Dormant Commerce 
Clause has its critics among the current Justices as well.38 This will 
be explored further in Part III of this Note. 
Ultimately, under the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, a 
state must prove that its interest in burdening commerce is legiti­
mate, and that there are no less burdensome means of achieving its 
ends.39 The plaintiffs in direct-shipment cases argue that the state's 
intent to ban out-of-state direct alcohol shipments is not legitimate, 
and that even if it is, there are less burdensome means available to 
the states to accomplish any legitimate goals. Thus, these plaintiffs 
assert that the direct-shipment laws are facially discriminatory and 
designed purely to favor local business by allowing them to ship 
ing pasteurization within five mile radius found unconstitutional because there are rea­
sonable non-discriminatory alternatives to serve the city's interests). 
34. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1992). 
35. TRIBE, supra note 15 §6-6, at 1059. 
36. Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99; see also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 
U.S. 617 (1978) (holding that the state may not discriminate against out-of-state waste 
products because they do not present a reason apart from their origin, to treat them 
differently). Only one recent case has involved a discriminatory regulation being up­
held - Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (holding that because of the "peculiar evil" 
presented by the out-of-state products, the state may prohibit their entry into the state). 
37. TRIBE, supra note 15 §6-6, at 1066 (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 
437, 454 (1992». 
38. Justice Scalia has been particularly critical of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis engaged in by the Court, while Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
have also raised questions as to the legitimacy and/or state of Dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 
520 U.S. 564, 608 (1997) (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n 
v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., con­
curring in the judgment); American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167,202 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Kassel v. Consolidated Freighways Corp. of 
Del., 450 U.S. 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For further discussion, see 
also TRIBE, supra note 15 §§6-2 and 6-6. 
39. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 617 (New Jersey statute excluding plaintiffs' waste 
from entering the state found unconstitutional because the statute was a protectionist 
measure on its face and in effect without a justifiable reason). 
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directly to consumers intrastate.4o The defendants, however, argue 
that the Twenty-First Amendment creates an exception to the Dor­
mant Commerce Clause, allowing them to regulate without regard 
for the Commerce Clause, and as a result, the balancing test analy­
sis does not apply. 
B. The Twenty-First Amendment 
1. Before Prohibition 
Alcohol regulation and the Commerce Clause have repeatedly 
intertwined over the years, beginning in the first half of the Nine­
teenth century with The License Cases.41 In 1887, the Supreme 
Court decided in Mugler v. Kansas that state laws banning the pro­
duction and consumption of alcohol were constitutiona1.42 In that 
case, Peter Mugler built a brewery in 1877 in Kansas; in 1880, the 
Kansas state constitution was modified to prohibit the manufacture 
and sale of intoxicating liquor except for medical or scientific pur­
poses.43 Mugler asserted violations of his constitutional rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, while Kansas argued its right to 
regulate under the police power.44 Since there was no evidence that 
Mugler's beer was intended to enter interstate commerce, the Court 
did not attempt to discuss the issue of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause and deferred it until a later date.45 
Three years later in Leisy v. Hardin, the Court finally had a 
chance to look at an interstate alcohol shipment case when the 
Leisy Company's beer was seized in Iowa after it was shipped there 
40. The discrimination within these direct-shipment laws comes from the excep­
tions that some of the states have for in-state wineries to ship direct to consumers, while 
prohibiting out-of-state wineries from doing so. 
41. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847). 
42. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Peter Mugler, a naturalized citizen, built a brewery in 
1877 in Salina, Kansas. Id. An article was adopted into the Kansas state constitution on 
November 2, 1880 which read that "[t]he manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors 
shall be forever prohibited in this State, except for medical, scientific, and mechanical 
purposes." [d. at 655. Mugler was found guilty on two separate indictments of violating 
the statute, for manufacturing and selling beer without a license. [d. at 653. Each time 
he was fined one hundred dollars and put in the county jail until the fine was paid. Id. 
Appealing a decision by the Supreme Court of Kansas, Mugler brought his complaint to 
the United States Supreme Court arguing a Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Im­
munities violation. Id. He claimed that he was not being permitted to pursue his trade, 
which violated his constitutional rights; the state asserted its right under the "police 
power" to regulate dangerous substances. Id. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. 
45. [d. at 674. 
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from Illinois in June of 1888.46 The Iowa law was passed on April 
12, 1888, prohibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating li­
quors in the state, except for those who had permits for medicinal, 
chemical or sacramental purposes.47 Plaintiffs brought suit against 
the state alleging that the law violated the Commerce Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, and appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.48 The Court found that the statute violated the Commerce. 
Clause, and that Leisy could ship his beer to Iowa as long as it was 
in the original packaging because it was an item of interstate 
commerce.49 . 
In response to Leisy, Congress quickly passed the Wilson Act50 
in 1890, which allowed states to regulate imported liquor, without 
discrimination, thereby eliminating the advantage of interstate sale. 
Narrowly reading the Wilson Act, the Supreme Court interjected its 
interpretation in 1898, holding in Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co. 
that the Wilson Act only permitted the state to regulate alcohol in 
its original packaging, and that the right to otherwise ship liquor is 
derived from the Constitution and could not be prohibited by the 
states.51 Congress responded again in 1913 with the sweeping 
Webb-Kenyon Act,52 which gave states complete control over a1co­
46. 135 U.S. 100 (1890). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 125. 
50. Wilson Act, 26 STAT. 313 (1890). 
That all fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids trans­
ported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, 
sale or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject 
to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the 
exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as 
though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, 
and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in 
original packages or otherwise. 
Id. 
51. 170 U.S. 438, 456 (1898) (holding that South Carolina state officers' seizing of 
liquor shipped by an out-of-state seller was unconstitutional). 
52. Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 STAT. 699 (1913): 

That the shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means whatso­

ever, of any spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other intoxicating liquor 

of any kind, from one State, Territory, or District of the United States, or place 

noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, into any other State, 

Territory, or District of the United States, or place noncontinguous to but sub­

ject to the jurisdiction thereof, or from any foreign country into any State, 

Territory, or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but sub­

ject to the jurisdiction thereof, which said spirituous, vinous, malted, fer­

mented, or other intoxicating liquor is intended, by any person interested 

therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the 
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hoI regulation, whether in its original packaging or not. 
Bolstered by the Webb-Kenyon Act, the prohibition move­
ment gained momentum and the movement's efforts came to frui­
tion in 1919 with the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment.53 
The Amendment prohibited all manufacture and sale of "intoxicat­
ing liquors."54 With the Eighteenth Amendment's passage banning 
alcohol throughout the nation, there would no longer be a question 
as to how much power the states had to regulate alcohol. The new 
Amendment guaranteed that the federal government now had com­
plete control over alcohol distribution and sale, while sharing en­
forcement with the states. 
2. After Prohibition 
Prohibition proved to be a short-lived era in the nation's his­
tory. Franklin D. Roosevelt ran for the presidency on an anti-pro­
hibition platform, and won the office in 1932.55 The proposed 
Twenty-First Amendment sought to repeal Prohibition and was 
presented to the states by Congress on February 20, 1933.56 By De­
cember 5, 1933, enough states had ratified the Amendment and 
Prohibition was repealedY 
original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such State, Territory, 
or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, is hereby prohibited. 
Id. 
53. U.S. CaNsT. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CaNsT. amend. XXI: 
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, 
sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof 
into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. Section 
2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation. 
[d. 
54. Id. 
55. RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE 
REFORM, LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY 1880-1920 at 271 (1995). 
56. U.S. CaNST. amend. XXI. 

Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the 

United States is hereby repealed. Section 2. The transportation or importa­

tion into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or 






57. According to a New York Times article from December 6,1933, "[pJrohibition 
of alcoholic beverages as a national policy ended at 5:32 lh p.m., Eastern Standard 
Time." Final Action at Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1933 at AI. Utah was the last state 
to ratify, following the Pennsylvania and Ohio ratifications earlier the same day. Id. 
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The amendment itself was introduced by Senator Blaine, 
Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee that held the hearings on 
the Amendment. Initially, the amendment contained three sections 
- it included the two sections in the final adopted version, plus a 
third section that would have given certain powers to the federal 
government.58 Senator Blaine opposed this third section, and be­
lieved that it contradicted section 2; he stated that section 2 "[re­
stored] to the States, in effect, the right to regulate commerce 
respecting a single commodity - namely, intoxicating liquor."59 He 
further elaborated, stating that "[t]he purpose of section 2 is to re­
store to the States by constitutional amendment absolute control in 
effect over interstate commerce affecting intoxicating liquors which 
enter the confines of the States."60 
Senator Blaine was not alone in his opposition to section 3; 
Senator Wagner stated that by including the section, the amend­
ment "[would] not restore to the States responsibility for their local 
liquor problems. "61 Other Senators placed great emphasis on the 
plenary power the second section would grant; Senator Robinson, 
who motioned the successful striking down of section 3, maintained 
that "it is left entirely to the States to determine in what manner 
intoxicating liquors shall be sold or used and to what places such 
liquor may be transported."62 Senator Wagner summed up this be­
lief by stating that "[t]he real cause of the failure of the 18th 
Amendment was that it attempted to impose a single standard of 
conduct upon all the people of the United States without regard to 
local sentiment and local habits. "63 
Not only did the new Amendment repeal Prohibition, but it 
also gave the power to regulate alcohol back to the states, closely 
following the Webb-Kenyon Act wording.64 It was not long before 
the Supreme Court needed to define what kind of power the states 
had been granted through the new Amendment. 
In 1936, the Court determined in State Board of Equalization v. 
Young's Market Co. that the states were given an unconditional 
58. The proposed section three would have read that "Congress shall have con­
current power to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors to be drunk on the 
premises where sold." 76 CONGo REC. S4141 (1933). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at S4143. 
61. Id. at S4144. 
62. Id. at S4225. Also see the comments of Senators Black, id. at S4177-78, and 
Walsh, id. at S4219. 
63. /d. at S4146. 
64. Id. 
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grant of power through the Twenty-First Amendment, reading it lit­
erally.65 In addition, the Court held in two 1939 cases that the 
amendment sanctioned the right of the states to regulate alcohol 
"unfettered" by the Commerce Clause.66 In the first of these cases, 
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, an Indiana carrier sought to restrain the en­
forcement of a 1938 Kentucky statute that allowed criminal charges 
to be brought against someone who transported liquor without a 
license.67 The carrier claimed that the statute violated the Com­
merce Clause, but the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that "[t]he 
Twenty-First Amendment sanctions the right of a State to legislate 
concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without, unfettered by 
the Commerce Clause."68 
The second case, Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control 
Commission, dealt with an Indiana brewery that argued that a 
Michigan statute was unconstitutional as a violation of the Com­
merce Clause.69 The Michigan act prohibited the importation of 
beer from states that restricted the importation of Michigan's alco­
hol products.7o The brewery argued that its inability to sell in Mich­
igan violated the Commerce Clause.?l The Court disagreed, stating 
that even if the law could be considered retaliatory, "the right of a 
state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is 
not limited by the commerce clause."72 
The Court's broad reading of the Twenty-First Amendment 
was not to last indefinitely. By 1964, the Supreme Court made an 
altogether different assessment of the Twenty-First Amendment in 
Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.73 In Hostetter, a li­
quor company named Idlewild was in the business of selling liquor 
65. 299 U.S. 59 (1936). In this case, the plaintiffs were licensed wholesalers who 
refused to apply for a separate importer's license to sell imported beer, arguing that 
wholesalers of imported products were being discriminated against under the Com­
merce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 60-61. The Supreme Court found 
that California's statute did not violate either clause. Id. at 63-64. Particularly, the 
statute did not violate the Commerce Clause because the Twenty-First Amendment 
allowed the state to enforce any conditions it chose for the regulation of alcohol. Id. at 
64. 
66. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Li­
quor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939). 
67. ZitJrin, 308 U.S. at 132. 
68. Id. at 137-38. 
69. Indianapolis Brewing Co., 305 U.S. at 391. 
70. Id. at 392. 
71. Id. at 393-94. 
72. Id. at 394. 
73. 377 U.S. 324 (1964). 
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at New York's JFK Airport to people going on international 
flights. 74 When customers purchased the liquor, it was not given to 
them at that time, but instead placed on the plane for them so they 
could claim it once they reached their destination.75 The New York 
Liquor Authority advised Idlewild that they were in violation of the 
state's liquor laws because they were "unlicensable" and were to 
cease operations.76 
On appeal, the Supreme Court was confronted with the issue 
of "whether the Twenty-First Amendment so far obliterates the 
Commerce Clause as to empower New York to prohibit absolutely 
the passage of liquor through its territory."77 The Court acknowl­
edged its earlier decisions holding that a state was unconfined by 
the Commerce Clause.78 However, the Court said that "[t]o draw a 
conclusion from this line of decisions that the Twenty-First Amend­
ment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Commerce Clause 
wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned would ... 
be an absurd oversimplification."79 Otherwise, "Congress would be 
left with no regulatory power over interstate or foreign commerce 
in intoxicating liquor. "80 In this case, the state was essentially 
prohibiting people from removing alcohol from New York. Thus, 
Hostetter stands for the proposition that although states have been 
granted a broad authority to regulate alcohol, the Twenty-First 
Amendment does not allow states to extend that authority outside 
of the state.81 
Hostetter laid the groundwork for later decisions that would 
impact the direct-shipment of alcohol. The Court stated that "the 
Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of 
the same Constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitution, 
74. Id. at 325. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 326. 
77. Id. at 329. 
78. Id. at 330. See Indianapolis Brewing Co., 305 U.S. at 391 (finding Michigan 
law that prohibited importation of alcohol from states that did not allow unrestricted 
importation of Michigan-manufactured alcohol constitutional because Michigan had the 
right to regulate alcohol within its borders without violating the Commerce Clause); 
State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936) (finding that a 
required permit for importation of alcohol did not violate the Commerce Clause be­
cause the Twenty-First Amendment conferred on the states the power to establish con­
ditions for importation and forbid non-compliant importations). 
79. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 331-32. 
80. Id. at 332. 
81. This is an important distinction because the direct-shipment laws currently at 
issue involve the prohibition of alcohol coming into the state. 
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each must be considered in the light of the other, and in the context 
of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case."82 This 
philosophy would permeate through the next forty years.83 
Arguably the most relevant direct-shipment case was decided 
by the Supreme Court twenty years after Hostetter in 1984 -
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias.84 All of the recent direct-shipment 
cases cite to it frequently, whether they use it as a primary authority 
or not.85 
In Bacchus, importers challenged a Hawaiian excise tax of 
20% based on the exemptions that existed for locally produced Ha­
waiian beverages.86 Specifically, the exemptions enacted in the 
1970s applied to okolehao brandy and pineapple wine.87 The Ha­
waii Supreme Court ruled on the Commerce Clause challenge that 
"the tax did not illegally discriminate against interstate commerce" 
because the burden was ultimately borne by Hawaiian citizens.88 
At the U.S. Supreme Court, the Hawaii argued that even if the 
tax exemption violated the Commerce Clause, it was "saved" by the 
Twenty-First Amendment.89 The Court, as in Hostetter, noted the 
broad language the Court used in earlier decisions, but nevertheless 
stated that "more recently we have recognized the obscurity of the 
legislative history of §2"90 of the Twenty-First Amendment.91 The 
82. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332. 
83. Although not a Commerce Clause case, it is worth noting that in Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) the Court recognized that the history of alcohol laws shows 
that states have been granted broad authority to regulate alcoholic beverages. Id. at 
205. A brief description of the Twenty-First Amendment's case history is presented in 
the Craig decision. Id. See also North Dakota v. U.S., 495 U.S. 423 (1990); Healy v. The 
Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989); Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984); 
and Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
84. 468 U.S. 263 (1984). See also Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) 
(holding that a state regulation prohibiting the retransmission of out-of-state alcoholic 
beverage commercials was not protected by the Twenty-First Amendment because the 
regulation of time, place, and manner of alcoholic sales was not implicated). 
85. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004); Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 
517 (6th Cir. 2003); Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003); Beskind v. Easley, 
325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003); Bainbridge v. Thrner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002); 
Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000). 
86. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265. 
87. Id. The original tax was enacted in 1939. Id. 
88. !d. at 267. The court held that the tax did not violate the Commerce Clause 
because there was no discrimination against interstate commerce; the liquor tax is on 
Hawaiian wholesalers, and thus only Hawaiians are burdened by the tax. Id. 
89. !d. at 274. Interestingly, the state did not argue this point until the case 
reached the Supreme Court level. !d. at 274 n.12. 
90. Id. at 274. 
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, §1 ("The eighteenth article of Amendment to the 
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Court cited in particular to the Senate sponsor of the Amendment 
resolution, Senator Blaine, who himself offered differing views of 
the purpose of § 2 of the Amendment.92 At one point, Senator 
Blaine said that the purpose was "to restore to the States ... abso­
lute control in effect over interstate commerce affecting intoxicat­
ing liquors ...."93 At another point, Senator Blaine said that it was 
"to assure the so-called dry States against the importation of intoxi­
cating liquor into those States, it is proposed to write permanently 
into the Constitution a prohibition along that line."94 
Stating that it was now "clear" that state regulation was not 
entirely removed from the Commerce Clause, the Court held in 
Bacchus that if the interests of the state regulation are closely re­
lated to the powers reserved by the Twenty-First Amendment, the 
state law may prevail over the Commerce Clause.95 The Court con­
cluded that under this analysis, the discriminatory tax could not 
stand because it favored local business.96 The Court said that with­
out question, "[t]he central purpose of the [Twenty-First Amend­
ment] was not to empower States to favor local liquor industries by 
erecting barriers to competition."97 Therefore, "[s]tate laws that 
constitute mere economic protectionism are ... not entitled to the 
same deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an 
unrestricted traffic in liquor."98 Bacchus would be heavily relied 
upon by the federal courts of appeals in the direct-shipment cases. 
The two most recent Supreme Court cases that contribute to 
the current direct-shipment debate are Healey v. The Beer Insti­
tute99 and North Dakota v. United States.1oo In Healey, a Connecti­
cut law was challenged; it required that out-of-state beer shippers 
affirm that the prices at which they sold beer in Connecticut were 
no higher than their prices in the bordering states of Massachusetts, 
Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed."); U.S. CaNsT. amend. XXI, § 2 
("The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the 
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws 
thereof, is hereby prohibited."). 
92. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 274 (1984). See discussion supra 
notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
93. 76 CONGo REC. S4143 (1933). 
94. /d. at S4141. 
95. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 275-76 (adopting and citing to Capital Cities Cable, Inc. 
V. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984)). 
96. Id. at 276. 
97. Id. 
98. /d. 
99. 491 U.S. 324 (1989). 
100. 495 U.S. 423 (1990). 
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New York, and Rhode Island.101 In striking down the law, the ma­
jority determined that if a statute has the "practical effect" of regu­
lating alcohol in another state, it is not saved by the Twenty-First 
Amendment.102 Justice Scalia's concurring opinion found that fa­
cial discrimination eliminated the immunity afforded by the 
Twenty-First Amendment.103 
In North Dakota, the United States brought suit against North 
Dakota seeking relief from the State's alcohol labeling and report­
ing requirements.104 The federal government argued the require­
ments interfered with its ability to get lower prices for the military 
bases in the state.105 In looking at the Twenty-First Amendment, 
the Supreme Court noted that the state has "virtually complete con­
trol" over liquor distribution systems.106 Also, the Court "made 
clear that the States have the power to control shipments of liquor 
during their passage through their territory and to take appropriate 
steps to prevent the unlawful diversion of liquor into their regulated 
intrastate markets. "107 The Court then stated that liquor laws were 
given a presumption of validity under the Twenty-First Amendment 
and were "not to be set aside lightly."los The North Dakota regula­
tions fell "within the core of the State's power under the Twenty­
First Amendment" by "promoting temperance, ensuring orderly 
market conditions, and raising revenue."I09 These "core concerns" 
were also to play an important role in the analysis of the courts of 
appeals in making their decisions in the direct-shipment cases. 
C. The Alcohol Direct-Shipment Laws 
State laws banning direct-shipments of alcohol were typically 
passed in the years immediately following the repeal of Prohibi­
101. Healey, 491 U.S. at 326. 
102. Id. at 342 (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor 
Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 585 (1986» . 
103. Id. at 344. It is important to note that this case, like Hostetter, dealt with the 
prohibition of regulation in another state and not intrastate. 
104. North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 423. The North Dakota laws required that out-of­
state shippers file monthly reports with the state of all shipments and returns, and also 
that on each item sold to a federal enclave they affix labels stating that the item is only 
for domestic consumption within the enclave. Id. at 429. 
105. Id. at 426-29. 
106. Id. at 431. 
107. Id. Again, it is important to note the distinction made in this case between a 
state law regulating within its borders and a state law having the practical effect of 
regulating outside of its borders. 
108. [d. at 433. 
109. [d. at 432. 
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tion.l1O Twenty-four states still ban direct alcohol shipments. 11l 
Some states have repealed these laws - only four states permitted 
interstate direct-shipments a decade ago, but now there are twenty­
seven states that permit such shipments.112 
Direct shipping bans in those twenty-three states occur in three 
categories: anti-direct-shipment states, limited anti-direct-shipment 
states, and "reciprocity" states.113 Anti-direct-shipment states com­
pletely prohibit direct-shipments to consumers.114 A violation of 
these laws is a felony in Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and 
most recently, Utah.us 
States that limit direct-shipment have varying requirements for 
quantities and licensing.116 Sixteen states and the District of Co­
lumbia fall within this category.117 The limitations are varied, and 
range from vague to specific. For example, in Alaska, a "reasona­
ble amount" of alcohol may be shipped, while in Washington, D.C. 
there is a limit of one gallon per person.118 Most of the remaining 
states require a permit and the payment of taxes, while some just 
require a permit.119 
Reciprocity states allow shipments from states with similar 
laws and privileges.12o These states typically permit shipments from 
110. For example, North Carolina enacted its laws in 1937. Beskind v. Easley, 325 
F.3d 506, 519 (4th Cir. 2003). Texas enacted its code in 1935. Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 
F.3d 388, 397 (5th Cir. 2003). 
111. Free the Grapes!, supra note 2. This includes the following states: AL, AZ, 
AR, CT, DE, FL, GA, IN, KS, KY, ME, MD, MA, MI, MS, MT, NJ, NY, OH, OK, PA, 
SD, TN, UT, and VT. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Molnar, supra note 9, at 172. 
114. Free the Grapes!, supra note 2. States with complete bans include AL, AR, 
DE, FL, IN, KS, KY, ME, MA, MI, MS, NJ, NY, OH, OK, SD, TN, UT, and VT. Id. 
115. Id. Utah's felony legislation passed in 2003. Id. Note that although Georgia 
and Maryland allow for limited direct shipping, a violation of the state's laws is still a 
felony. Id. 
116. Molnar, supra note 9, at 172. This Comment provides a more detailed back­
ground on the different statutory structures. 
117. Free the Grapes!, supra note 2. States in this category include AK, AZ, CT, 
DC, GA, LA, MT, NE, NV, NH, NC, ND, SC, RI, TX, VA, and WY. 
118. Id. The Alaska rule comes from the Alaskan Attorney General's interpreta­
tion in 1953 of ALASKA STAT. § 1710 - "An individual who is not in the liquor business 
may import, without a license, a reasonable quantity of intoxicating liquor for personal 
use and consumption." ALASKA STAT. § 1710.11. The District of Columbia rule comes 
from D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-137 (1982). 
119. Free the Grapes!, supra note 2. States requiring a permit only include CT, 
MT, SC and TX. Id. States requiring a permit and payment of taxes are GA, LA, NE, 
NV (permit over 2,000 cases), NH, NC, ND, and WY. Id. Arizona and Rhode Island 
are on-site only. Id. Virginia requires a permit and a report. Id. 
120. Molnar, supra note 9, at 169. 
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other states that have a "reciprocal privilege."121 Thirteen states 
currently fall into this category.122 
The laws most commonly challenged in the direct-shipment 
cases involve a three-tier distributiori system that has an in-state 
exception.123 In a typical three-tier distribution system, the state­
licensed distributor purchases the wine from the winery, then sells it 
to a state-licensed retailer, who in turn sells it to the general public. 
In-state exceptions allow consumers to bypass this system if they 
purchase wine directly from an in-state winery. 
Lawsuits have arisen because consumers and wine-makers are 
upset with their inability to directly ship wine. Wine production is 
at an all-time high in the United States.124 In 2002, 595 million gal­
lons of wine were produced as compared to 337 million gallons in 
1972.125 The average amount of wine consumed per person based 
on the entire population increased from 1.61 gallons per person in 
1972 to 2.02 gallons per person in 1999.126 In the past 30 years, the 
number of United States wineries has increased by over 500% to 
2,100.127 "U.S. wineries produce over 10,000 new wines each vin­
tage, but nearly all wineries are small producers; 2,050 of America's 
wineries produce less than 5% of U.S. wine production. And less 
than 17 % of U.S. wineries are represented by distributors in all 50 
states."128 Since distributors will often not carry the vintages of 
small-production wineries, consumers desiring them have difficulty 
obtaining the wine of their choice.129 It is this problem that has 
some groups, like the Coalition for Free Trade, concerned that 
121. Id. 
122. Free the Grapes!, supra note 2. Reciprocity states include CA, CO, HI, ID, 
IL, lA, MN, MO, NM, OR, WA, WI, and WV. 
123. Note that these in-state exceptions to the direct shipping ban have typically 
been passed by state legislatures years after the original shipping ban legislation. For 
example, North Carolina's in-state exception was passed as a 1980 amendment - nearly 
fifty years after the original legislation. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-102.1, 18B-109, 18B­
1114, 18B-102, and 105-113.83. It is also interesting to note that there may be a further 
distinction of "control" states versus "licensing" states - control states actually partici­
pate to a certain extent in the merchandising cycle of the alcohol. Brief for the Petition­
ers at 4, Granholm v. Heald (No. 03-1116). There are currently eighteen control states. 
[d. 
124. Wine Institute, at http://www.wineinstitute.orglcommunications/statistics/ 
wine_production_key_facts.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). 
125. Wine Institute, at http://www.wineinstitute.orglcommunications/statistics/ 
consumption1934_99.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). 
126. [d. 
127. Free the Grapes!, supra note 2. 
128. [d. 
129. [d. 
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trade is being impinged by the direct-shipment bans.13° Addition­
ally, with 10,000 new wines being produced each year, it is not feasi­
ble for the distributors to carry every vintage on the market.131 
Thus, for oenophiles132 around the country, the best way to obtain 
the wine of their choice would be to order it online or by catalog ­
if the state of their residence permitted it to be shipped directly to 
them. 
The "mom and pop" small wineries are not the only ones who 
do not benefit from the distribution systems in place. "Boutique" 
wineries133 would prefer not to use distributors; they are so popular 
that they could successfully sell their wines entirely through direct 
channels and not give up the 20% or so in profit that distributors 
eat Up.134 
Wineries and wine consumers are proponents of laws that per­
mit direct-shipment. They argue that direct-shipment laws are not 
"saved" by the Twenty-First Amendment, and thus, violate the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.135 The direct wine shipment support­
ers got a boost in July of 2003 by the Federal Trade Commission's 
(FTC) report on e-commerce and the wine market.136 The report 
concluded that consumers would significantly benefit from direct­
shipments, and that consumers would save as much as 21 % on wine 
130. Coalition for Free Trade, supra note 9. 
131. It is interesting to note that although the number of wineries has increased 
significantly in recent years, the same cannot be said for liquor wholesalers. According 
to the Federal Trade Commission, the number of wholesalers has shrunk from several 
thousand in the 1950s to only a few hundred at the present. Federal Trade Commission, 
E-commerce Lowers Prices, Increases Choices in Wine Market, at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
opa/2003/07/t, released July 3, 2003. 
132. An oenophile is "one who appreciates and enjoys wine; a collector of wine." 
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Houghton Mif­
flin Company, 4th ed., 2000). 
133. "Boutique" wines are small production wines (e.g., Screaming Eagle, Helen 
Turley) that because of their uniqueness have developed devoted followings. These 
wines can command very high prices at auction, and are eagerly sought out by wine 
lovers. 
134. Marcia Coyle, Can This Wine Travel?, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, July 
28, 2003, at 1. 
135. Several of the cases have raised additional claims and/or discussion under 
the First Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Swedenburg case 
raised both of these sub-issues. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 239-41 (2d Cir. 
2004). See also U.S. CaNsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 403, n. 
173 (5th Cir. 2003) (court briefly discusses the potential for a "colorable claim" under 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause). However, the U.S. Supreme Court will not be 
addressing these additional claims when the Heald and Swedenburg cases come before 
it during the 2004-2005 term. 
136. Coyle, supra note 134, at 1; Wine Institute, at http://www.wineinstitute.org! 
communications/statistics/ftc_online.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). 
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purchases through e-commerce sales. l37 Further, the FTC believes 
that the states can regulate through less-restrictive means; they can 
combat fears of sales to minors by requiring adult signatures upon 
delivery, and can solve revenue-raising issues by requiring tax on 
shipments into the state.138 This strikes directly at the "core con­
cerns" that were expressed in North Dakota, and that the states so 
frequently argue.139 The wineries and wine consumers accuse the 
wholesalers of making policy arguments based on myths - the 
myths that direct shipping will increase underage access, that winer­
ies do not want to pay taxes, and that there will be a fundamental 
breakdown of law and order. l40 The "myths" have been promul­
gated by supporters of the shipment bans; for example, the Wine & 
Spirit Wholesalers of America, Inc. have numerous articles on their 
website promoting regulation and enforcement of regulations as the 
best way to prevent underage drinking.141 The Federal Trade Com­
mission Report directly contradicts their claims.142 
On the other side, states, supported by wholesalers, oppose di­
rect-shipment laws.143 They argue that the Twenty-First Amend­
ment grants them the power to regulate alcohol, and in effect 
creates an exception to the Commerce Clause. These proponents 
of the Twenty-First Amendment point out the unique treatment al­
cohol has received, often paraphrasing Judge Frank Easterbrook's 
comments from the Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson decision when 
he pointed out that wine is not cheese.144 States assert the view that 
alcohol has been treated differently for a reason; there are compel­
ling state interests behind regulations that help prevent sales to mi­
nors, assist the state in collecting taxes, and in overall market 
regulation and monitoring. According to the Michigan petition for 
certiorari, "the historical basis for the (state) structure, as recog­
137. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 131. 
138. Id. 
139. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 426 (1990). 
140. See Free the Grapes!, supra note 2. 
141. Wine & Spirit Wholesalers of America, Inc., at http://www.wswa.orglpublic/ 
policy/direct.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). 
142. See supra note 131. 
143. Interestingly, the "Free the Grapes" organization devotes a section of its 
web page to pointing out the power and determination of the wholesalers' lobbying 
efforts. For example, they point out that they "aggressively" supported a Texas bill in 
1999 that would carry the same penalty for shipping a bottie of wine to an adult con­
sumer as assault with a deadly weapon. They point out that then-governor Bush did not 
sign the bill into law. See Free the Grapes!, supra note 2. 
144. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2000). See also 
Eryn Brown, The Wine Wars, N.Y. TIMES, BUSINESS SECITON, Aug. 24, 2003 at 1. 
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nized by this Court, is to protect against the collusion, price-fixing 
and monopolization problems that existed before Prohibition."145 
Wholesalers in particular seem to fear that if the direct-ship­
ment bans are lifted, they will lose a significant portion of their bus­
iness to the Internet.146 They also discount the FTC report, 
asserting that it is politically motivated and not focused on the con­
stitutional issues.147 The Wine & Spirit Wholesalers of America, 
Inc. state that "some wineries and retailers - under the guise of 
promoting 'consumer choice' - market and ship alcohol on an inter­
state basis directly to consumers."148 They further assert that over 
one billion dollars of alcohol is shipped to consumers illegally every 
year.149 
In 2000, President Clinton signed the "Twenty-First Amend­
ment Enforcement Act" into law.150 This law was passed by Con­
gress at the urging of states and wholesalers seeking enforcement 
methods for the three-tier distribution systems.151 The Act allows 
state attorneys general to seek injunctive relief against violators of 
state anti-shipment laws, if the violator is operating outside of the 
state.152 Any violator failing to abide by an injunction could be­
come subject to penalties and/or imprisonment for contempt.153 
The disagreement between the two sides boils down to two 
fundamental issues: what are the core purposes of the Twenty-First 
Amendment, and how can the states regulate to promote those pur­
poses?154 States feel that the core purposes are to promote temper­
ance, ensure orderly market conditions, and raise revenue through 
taxes.155 Further, they believe that the core purposes allow them 
the power to regulate alcohol in any way necessary to promote 
145. Gearan, supra note 10 (citing Petition for Certiorari at 3, Heald v. Engler, 
342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003), available at http://www.coalitionforfreetrade.orgllitigation/ 
michiganlmichcert.pdf) (last visited Sept. 4, 2004». 
146. Coyle, supra note 134, at 1. 
147. Id. 
148. Wine & Spirit Wholesalers of America, Inc., supra note 141. 
149. Id. 
150. 27 U.S.C.S. § 122a (2004). 
151. See generally 27 U.S.C.S. § 122a (2004); 145 CONGo REC. H6856 (1999). 
152. 27 U.S.C.S. § 122a (2004). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. Upon granting the petitions for certiorari submitted in the Swedenburg 
and Heald cases, the Supreme Court narrowed the question to be decided as follows: 
"Does a State's regulatory scheme that permits in-state wineries directly to ship alcohol 
to consumers but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so violate the dor­
mant Commerce Clause in light of Sec. 2 of the 21st Amendment?" Swedenburg V. 
Kelly, Granholm V. Heald, 72 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. May 24, 2004). 
155. Wine & Spirit Wholesalers of America, Inc., supra note 141. 
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those purposes; thus arises the contention that the amendment pro­
vides an exception to the Commerce Clause.156 
Wineries and their supporters disagree with this assessment.157 
They also believe that a core purpose of the Twenty-First Amend­
ment is to promote temperance, but that the states can only legis­
late to the extent that they do not interfere with the Commerce 
Clause.158 The federal courts of appeals have debated these very 
questions, and have reached differing results and provided different 
remedies. Now, the Supreme Court must make the final determina­
tion in this ongoing debate. 
II. THE CIRCUIT CASES 
Six direct-shipment cases have reached the level of a U.S. 
Court of Appeals. 159 Two circuit splits have resulted from the 
cases. One concerns the constitutionality of the direct-shipment 
laws themselves; the second on how to remedy the situation when a 
direct-shipment ban is found to be unconstitutional. The first case 
decided was in 2000 when the Seventh Circuit ruled that Indiana's 
direct-shipment ban was constitutional, and that its regulatory sys­
tem should be upheld.160 Two years later, the Eleventh Circuit 
found that Florida's ban was unconstitutional, thus creating the first 
circuit split.161 The second split occurred as a result of the Eleventh 
and Fourth Circuit decisions, which were then followed by two 
more decisions, all with differing results and remedies.162 
The four courts of appeals that have found the statutes to be 
unconstitutional have generally relied on similar reasoning, al­
though their remedies have differed.163 First, they look to see if the 
state regulation violates the Dormant Commerce Clause, and if it 




159. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004); Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 
517 (6th Cir. 2003); Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003); Beskind v. Easley, 
325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002); 
Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000). 
160. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 848. The Second Circuit also found New York's 
laws to be constitutional. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 223. 
161. Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1104. 
162. See Heald, 342 F.3d at 517; Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 388; Beskind, 325 F.3d at 
506; Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1104. 
163. See Heald, 342 F.3d at 524; Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 407; Beskind, 325 F.3d at 
514; Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1112. 
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First Amendment outweigh the Commerce Clause principles.164 
The other two circuits did not follow this analysis, but instead by­
pass normal Dormant Commerce Clause analysis and look to "the 
scope of the Twenty-First Amendment's grant of authority" in de­
termining if the statute falls within that authority.165 
A. Seventh Circuit - Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson 
The original circuit split was created after the first two circuit 
cases were decided - the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bridenbaugh 
v. Freeman-Wilson 166 and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bain­
bridge v. Turner. 167 In Bridenbaugh, consumers challenged the 
constitutionality of Indiana's direct-shipment laws.168 The laws set 
out a three-tiered system of manufacturers, distributors, and retail­
ers; Indiana requires the distributors and retailers to have permits 
in Indiana.169 The laws permit Indiana wineries and distributors 
with a valid license to ship directly to consumers, but prohibit out­
of-state wineries from doing the samepo The district court found 
the laws violated the Constitution, but the Seventh Circuit stated 
that "§ 2 of the Twenty-First amendment empowers Indiana to con­
trol alcohol in ways that it cannot control cheese."171 In other 
words, "[i]f the product were cheese rather than wine, Indiana 
would not be able either to close its borders to imports or to insist 
that the shippers collect its taxes."172 
The parties on both sides asked the Seventh Circuit to look to 
164. This is the "core concerns" test which was adopted by several of the circuits, 
stemming largely from the Bacchus and North Dakota cases. See supra notes 84 and 
104. 
165. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 231. See also Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 848. 
166. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 848. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on 
April 23, 2001. 
167. Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1104. 
168. IND. CODE § 7.1-5-11-1.5 (2004). The law reads as follows: 
(a) It is unlawful for a person in the business of selling alcoholic beverages in 
another state or country to ship or cause to be shipped an alcoholic beverage 
directly to an Indiana resident who does not hold a valid wholesaler permit 
under this title. This includes the ordering and selling of alcoholic beverages 
over a computer network. (b) Upon determination by the commission that a 
person has violated subsection (a), a wholesaler may not accept a shipment of 
alcoholic beverages from the person for a period of up to one (1) year as 
determined by the commission. 
Id. 
169. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 850. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
170. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 849. 
171. Id. at 851. 
172. Id. 
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the "core concerns" of the AmendmentP3 The plaintiffs argued 
that the Amendment was intended to promote temperance, and 
that the Indiana laws were invalid because they did not further such 
a purpose.174 The defendants argued that orderly market condi­
tions and revenue-raising were also core concernsp5 The court 
noted that it was not necessarily a question of "core concerns," but 
rather a question of whether or not out-of-state liquor was being 
discriminated against.176 The court concluded that there was no 
discrimination because all alcohol passes through the same three­
tier system and that in-state permit holders may deliver wine di­
rectly to consumers no matter where the wine is from.177 They 
found that Indiana wine producers are not benefited in any way; no 
matter who ships it, there is no advantage to the local wine produc­
ers.178 Therefore, the law banning direct-shipment was found to be 
constitutional because the law was considered non-discriminatory; 
it banned direct-shipment of any wine from out-of-state, no matter 
where it is manufactured.179 The court further analyzed the issue 
by looking to the scope of the Amendment; it stated that "§2 closes 
the loophole left by the dormant commerce clause."18o Since the 
scope included "importation," the laws were deemed valid.181 
Until February 2004, the Seventh Circuit was the only circuit to 
have found a direct-shipment ban to be constitutional, and the deci­
sion has thus been heavily criticized by other courts of appeals.182 
The strongest criticism is that the Seventh Circuit did not follow 




176. Id. at 853. The court's analysis was based on Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 
468 U.S. 263 (1984) (holding discriminatory state tax exempting certain Hawaiian-pro­
duced products unconstitutional as violative of the Commerce Clause). See supra notes 
84-98 and accompanying text. See also Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York 
State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (finding New York statute unconstitutional 
economic protectionism under the Commerce Clause because it could in effect control 
alcohol prices in other states). 
177. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 854. 
180. Id. at 853. 
181. Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2; supra note 3. 
182. See Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 526-27 (6th Cir. 2003); Bainbridge v. Tur­
ner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1114 (11th Cir. 2002). The primary criticism of Bridenbaugh case by 
these other circuits is that the court did not properly apply a Commerce Clause analysis 
to the statute before looking at the Twenty-First Amendment. 
183. See, e.g., Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 526-27 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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did not engage in enough analysis of the Commerce Clause and it 
relied too heavily on the text of the Twenty-First Amendment in 
reaching its decision.184 
B. Eleventh Circuit - Bainbridge v. Turner 
In Bainbridge, the Eleventh Circuit found the Florida laws to 
be unconstitutional.185 This decision was in direct contrast to the 
Seventh Circuit's decision in Bridenbaugh, thereby initiating the 
first of two direct-shipment law circuit splits. The Eleventh Cir­
cuit's decision was followed by three other circuits in 2003, which all 
found the laws in question to be unconstitutional.186 
In Bainbridge,187 consumers and out-of-state wineries sued the 
state of Florida over the constitutionality of its laws banning the 
direct-shipment of wine.188 The Eleventh Circuit held the state law 
to be facially discriminatory because it explicitly favored in-state 
wineries over out-of-state wineries.189 The court also noted that 
there were non-discriminatory alternatives to the law; these could 
include licensing out-of-state wineries and regulating out-of-state 
wineries in a similar fashion to those that are in-state.19o The court 
stated that the Florida Division of Alcoholic Beverages and To­
bacco failed to show as a matter of law that the regulatory scheme 
was so closely related to the core concern of raising revenue as to 
escape Commerce Clause scrutiny.191 The judgment of the district 
court, which had granted summary judgment in favor of the state, 
was vacated and remanded for further consideration, requiring that 
the state demonstrate why the felony prohibition on direct-ship­
ments was required for it to collect taxes.192 As of this time, there 
has not been a new decision on remand. 
184. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853. 
185. Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1104. 
186. See infra Part II, Sections D-F and accompanying text. 
187. Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1104. 
188. FLA. STAT. § 561.22(1), § 561.14(3), § 561.221 (1)(a), § 561.54(1), 
§ 561.57(2). Section 561.54(1) reads that 
it is unlawful for common or permit carriers, operators of privately owned 
cars, trucks, buses, or other conveyances or out-of-state manufacturers or sup­
pliers to make delivery from without the state of alcoholic beverage to any 
person, association of persons, or corporation within the state, except to quali­
fied manufacturers, distributors, and exporters of such beverages. 
/d. 
189. Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1115. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 1115. 
192. Id. at 1116. 
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C. Fourth Circuit - Beskind v. Easley 
In Beskind v. Easiey,193 California wineries wanting to ship 
wine to North Carolina and oenophiles in North Carolina wishing 
to receive shipments brought suit against the state to have the ship­
ment bans declared unconstitutional.194 Their suit challenged the 
North Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) laws, which 
prohibited direct-shipments to consumers, but maintained an in­
state exception for North Carolina wineries.195 The United States 
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina struck 
down the ABC laws in their entirety after finding them unconstitu­
tional.196 On appeal, the state argued that the district court abused 
its discretion in striking down the core provisions of the laws.197 
Although the North Carolina ABC laws have been maintained 
since 1937, the in-state exceptions were not created until an amend­
ment in 1981.198 The Fourth Circuit held that the laws clearly 
treated in-state and out-of-state wineries differently and that "in­
state wineries benefit from the very sort of vertical integration that 
the three-tiered scheme was originally designed to prevent."199 
However, the court pointed out that it was only through the 1981 
amendment that the state had injected unconstitutional discrimina­
tion.20o According to the court, North Carolina failed to prove that 
the discriminatory amendment supported a core purpose of the 
Twenty-First Amendment. 201 
The Fourth Circuit decided not to strike down the core provi-:.. 
sions of the statute as the district court had; the court believed that 
to do so would effectively eradicate the state's authority under the 
Twenty-First Amendment.202 The court pointed out the clear legis­
lative intent of the state in asserting its Twenty-First Amendment 
powers by citing to a section of the laws that declare they "shall be 
193. 325 F.3d 506 (4th CiT. 2003). The decision was announced by the court on 
April 8, 2003. Id. 
194. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B·102.1, 18B-109, 18B-1114, 18B-102, and 105-113.83. 
Section 18B-102.1 states that it is unlawful "for any person who is an out-of-state retail 
or wholesale dealer in the business of selling alcoholic beverages to ship or cause to be 
shipped any alcoholic beverage directly to any North Carolina resident who does not 
hold a valid wholesaler's permit." N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-102.1. 
195. Id. 
196. Beskind v. Easley, 197 F. Supp. 2d 464 (W.D.N.C. 2002). 
197. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 512 (4th CiT. 2003). 
198. Id. at 510. 
199. Id. at 515. 
200. Id. at 516. 
201. Id. at 517. 
202. Id. at 518. 
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liberally construed to the end that the sale, purchase, transporta­
tion, manufacture, consumption, and possession of alcoholic bever­
ages shall be prohibited except as authorized in this Chapter. "203 
Therefore, instead of striking down the entire regulatory structure, 
the court only struck down the offending amendment, thereby elim­
inating the discrimination in favor of in-state direct shippers.204 
This in effect created the second split, involving the remedy chosen 
by the courts finding the laws unconstitutional; while the Eleventh 
Circuit struck down the entire Florida statutory scheme, the Fourth 
Circuit only struck down the offending portions. In response, the 
North Carolina state legislature passed a bill allowing direct-ship­
ment, which became effective on October 1, 2003.205 
D. Fifth Circuit - Dickerson v. Bailey 
In Dickerson v. Bailey,206 wine consumers sued the State of 
Texas over the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Control (TABC)207 laws 
that were originally established in 1935.208 As with the other state 
structures, the Texas laws involve a three-tier distribution system 
with an in-state exception.209 The legislative history for the in-state 
exception blatantly states the economic reasons behind the law. 
This statement of legislative intent declares that the exception is 
intended "to assist the Texas wine industry in promoting and mar­
keting Texas wines."210 As the court says, "[t]o paraphrase the 
Bard, that which we call discrimination by any other name would 
still smell as foul."211 When the court then looked at whether the 
Twenty-First Amendment saved the TABC laws, it found little 
room for debate.212 Since the state did not even attempt to connect 
the statutory scheme to the core concerns of the amendment, the 
court found the scheme to be unconstitutional.213 
203. Id. at 519 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. §18B-100 (2004». 
204. Id. 
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1001.1. The law allows shippers to send a maximum 
of two cases of wine per month to any individual purchaser, and does not allow for 
resale of the shipped items. Id. 
206. 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003). This case was decided by the Fifth Circuit on 
June 26, 2003. Id. 
207. TEX. ALco. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 107.07(a), 107.07(f), 6.01, 11.01., 37.03, and 
107.05(a). 
208. Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 397. 
209. Id. at 397-98. 
210. TEX. ALco. BEV. CODE ANN. § 1l0.002(a). 
211. Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 398. 
212. Id. at 403-04. 
213. Id. 
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In determining a remedy, the court compared its case to 
Beskind v. Easley. The court declined to act as the Beskind court 
did, despite the state's wishes.214 The court noted that it was easy 
for the Beskind court to strike down the one provision, and that 
North Carolina's laws had a specific purpose statement215 which 
could be construed in favor of the regulation and control of alco­
hol,216 The Texas law was construed differently because it was not 
just one section to be removed from the statute; instead, "substan­
tial portions" of the laws would have to be re-written, forcing the 
court to act in the place of the legislature, something it was unwill­
ing to do.217 As a result, the court chose to enjoin the state from 
enforcing the provisions of the TABC laws.218 On August 25, 2003, 
Texas announced that it would not seek review by the U.S. Su­
preme Court.219 
E. Sixth Circuit - Heald v. Engler 
Shortly after Dickerson was decided, the Sixth Circuit's deci­
sion in Heald v. Engler was announced on August 28, 2003.220 Wine 
connoisseurs, wine journalists, and an out-of-state winery chal­
lenged the constitutionality of the Michigan Alcoholic Beverage 
Control (MABC) laws.221 The distribution system in Michigan fol­
lowed the typical three-tier system, with an in-state exception.222 
The district court held that "Michigan's direct-shipment law is a 
permitted exercise of state power under § 2 of the Twenty-First 
Amendment" because it is not "mere economic protectionism" but 
instead designed for tax collection and to prevent underage 
drinking.223 
On appeal, after the Sixth Circuit analyzed the Twenty-First 
214. Id. at 408-09. 
215. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
216. Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 409. 
217. Id. at 408-09. 
218. Id. at 410. 
219. Coalition for Free Trade, supra note 9. 
220. 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003). Note that the case name changed from Heald v. 
Engler to Heald v. Granholm after petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
This is a result of Sup. Ct. R. 35.3 which allows for the automatic substitution of current 
office holders in an action for the former office holders; Jennifer M. Granholm has 
replaced John M. Engler as the governor of Michigan. 
221. MICH. STAT. ANN. R436.1057, R436.1705(2)(d), R436.1719(4), MLC 
436.1113(9). 
222. Heald, 342 F.3d at 520. 
223. Id. at 521 (citing Heald v. Engler, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24826 (E.D. Mich., 
2001)). 
2004] THE GRAPE MARCH ON WASHINGTON 371 

Amendment and the Commerce Clause, it concluded that the de­
fendants had not presented sufficient evidence to show that the 
Michigan scheme furthered the core concerns of the Twenty-First 
Amendment, and that there were less discriminatory means availa­
ble to achieve its goals.224 The district court decision granting sum­
mary judgment to the defendants was reversed, and the laws were 
struck down in their entirety.225 
On February 2, 2004, Michigan's Attorney General filed a peti­
tion for certiorari with the Supreme Court requesting review of the 
Sixth Circuit decision.226 Commenting on the petition, Michigan 
Beer & Wine Wholesalers President Michael Lashbrook stated that 
"[a]n elite few want anyone with a credit card to be able to order 
alcohol with the click of a mouse" and that as a result, "minors will 
gain easy access to beer, wine, and liquor; our state will be robbed 
of vital revenues; and safeguards ensuring product purity will 
vanish."227 
On May 24, 2004 certiorari was granted in the Heald case.228 
The Court also granted cert in Swedenburg v. Kelly, the circuit deci­
sion that immediately followed Heald. 229 
F. Second Circuit - Swedenburg v. Kelly 
The Second Circuit has made the most recent contribution to 
the on-going debate, announcing its decision in Sweden burg v. Kelly 
on February 12, 2004.230 This case was appealed from the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, where 
that court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff out-of-state 
wine producers.231 The Second Circuit reversed the lower court's 
ruling, and upheld the direct-shipment laws as constitutional.232 
New York is a critical state in the "wine wars" because it is the 
second-largest wine market in the country and the largest of the 
224. [d. at 525-26. 
225. [d. at 527-28. 
226. See supra note 145. 
227. [d. 
228. Granholm v. Heald, 72 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. May 24, 2004). The grant of 
certiorari combines three cases - Granholm v. Heald, No. 03-1116, Michigan Beer and 
Wine Wholesalers Association v. Heald, No. 03-1120, and Swedenburg v. Kelly, No. 03­
1274. An amicus brief supporting Michigan's petition was signed by thirty-six state at­
torneys general. Gearan, supra note 10. 
229. 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004). 
230. [d. 
231. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
232. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 239-40. 
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states with shipping bans still in effect.233 As a result, there had 
been much speculation regarding the outcome. For example, the 
Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of America, Inc. had stated that the 
organization hoped that the district court remedy would be re­
versed, and that only the in-state exception would be struck down, 
as it was in Beskind.234 The organization got its wish and more. 
The Second Circuit upheld the entire statutory scheme, boldly stat­
ing that "[t]he Twenty-First Amendment is unequaled in our consti­
tutional experience - it repeals one constitutional provision and 
creates an exception to another. "235 
The New York statutory structure also consists of a three-tier 
sale and distribution scheme.236 Alcoholic beverages may not be 
shipped into the state without a license; the process of obtaining a 
license is rigorous, and requires the licensee to have a physical pres­
ence in the state, such as a factory, warehouse, or office.237 There­
fore, the plaintiffs argued that although they are not banned from 
obtaining a license, the qualifications - especially physical presence 
- are so onerous as to ban them in effect.238 
In making its decision, the court chose not to follow the two­
tier Dormant Commerce Clause analysis and core concerns test as 
espoused by previous circuits.239 The court stated that the two-step 
analysis "is flawed because it has the effect of unnecessarily limiting 
the authority delegated to the states through the clear and unam­
biguous language of section 2."240 Instead, the court followed the 
method used by the Seventh Circuit in Bridenbaugh to determine 
whether the statute falls within the scope of Twenty-First Amend­
ment authority.241 The court then found that New York's laws fell 
"squarely within the ambit of section 2's grant of authority."242 
A petition for certiorari was submitted to the Supreme Court 
and cert was granted on May 24, 2004.243 
233. Coyle, supra note 134, at 1. 
234. Wine and Spirit Wholesalers of America, Inc., supra note 141. 
235. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 227. 
236. N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW § 100(1) (2000). The law provides that "[n]o 
person shall manufacture for sale or sell at wholesale or retail any alcoholic beverage 
within the state without obtaining the appropriate license therefor [sic] required by this 
chapter." Id. 
237. N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 100(1), 1l0(1)(g), 76, 3(37) (2000). 
238. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 238 n.12. 
239. Id. at 230-31. 
240. Id. at 231. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 237. 
243. Sweden burg V. Kelly, 72 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. May 24, 2004). 
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to the 
Michigan and New York cases on May 24, 2004.244 The Court has 
limited its review to the following question: "Does a State's regula­
tory scheme that permits in-state wineries directly to ship alcohol to 
consumers but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause in light of Sec. 2 of the 21st 
Amendment?"245 
A. Arguments Presented to the Court 
The parties arguing before the Court on December 7, 2004 
have submitted their briefs, presenting their legal arguments to the 
Court,246 Numerous amicus briefs have also been filed, supporting 
either side in one or both of the cases.247 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Brief for the Petitioners, Granholm v. Heald (No. 03-1116); Petitioner's 
Brief on the Merits, Swedenburg v. Kelly (No. 03-1274); Brief for Petitioner, Michigan 
Beer and Wine Wholesalers Assoc. v. Heald (03-1120); Brief for the Respondents, 
Granholm v. Heald (No. 03-1116), Michigan Beer and Wine Wholesalers Assoc. v. 
Heald (03-1120); Brief for Private Respondents, Swedenburg v. Kelly (No. 03-1274); 
Brief for New York Respondents, Swedenburg v. Kelly (No. 03-1274). 
247. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Illinois Alcoholism and Drug Dependence 
Association in Support of Petitioners in Granholm and Respondents in Swedenburg, 
Granholm v. Heald (No. 03-1116), Michigan Beer and Wine Wholesalers Assoc. v. 
Heald (03-1120) and Swedenburg v. Kelly (No. 03-1274); Brief of the National Alcohol 
Beverage Control Association and the National Conference of State Liquor Adminis­
trators as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Swedenburg v. Kelly (No. 03-1274); 
Brief of the Virginia Wineries Associations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Granholm v. Heald (No. 03-1116) and Michigan Beer and Wine Wholesalers Assoc. v. 
Heald (03-1120); Brief of Michigan Association of Secondary School Principals, et aI., 
Granholm v. Heald (No. 03-1116) and Michigan Beer and Wine Wholesalers Assoc. v. 
Heald (03-1120); Brief of National Beer Wholesalers Association as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Granholm v. Heald (No. 03-1116) and Michigan Beer and Wine 
Wholesalers Assoc. v. Heald (03-1120); Brief for the Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of 
America, et aI., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners in Nos. 03-1116 & 1120 and 
Respondents in No. 03-1274; Brief of Ohio and 32 Other States as Amicus Curiae Sup­
porting Petitioners, Granholm v. Heald (No. 03-1116); Brief of Members of the United 
States Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Granholm v. Heald (No. 
03-1116); Brief Amicus Curiae of American Homeowner's Alliance, et aI., in Support of 
Respondent in Granholm v. Heald (No. 03-1116); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Beer 
Institute in Support of Respondents, Swedenburg v. Kelly (No. 03-1274); Brief of the 
Goldwater Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Granholm v. Heald 
(No. 03-1116); Brief of Amicus Curiae Wine Institute in Support of Respondents, 
Granholm v. Heald (No. 03-1116); Brief of Millbrook Vineyards & Winery as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Swedenburg v. Kelly (No. 03-1274). 
374 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:343 
1. Michigan Statutory Scheme 
In Granholm v. Heald,248 the petitioners, hereinafter referred 
to as "Michigan," present arguments to the Court that largely focus 
on the language and legislative history of the Twenty-First Amend­
ment, as well as the "core concerns" that have been such a large 
part of the debate in the appeals court decisions. According to the 
petitioner, "Michigan requires that beverage alcohol pass through 
the hands of licensees with a substantial in-State physical presence 
that makes them subject to effective state regulation and enforce­
ment. "249 Michigan points out that the licensing process involves 
rigorous investigation and that even once licensed, the licensees 
must comply with numerous laws.25o Because direct-shipment 
transactions occur largely in private and away from enforcement 
mechanisms in place, the state has determined that the best way to 
deal with that problem is to strictly regulate importation and deliv­
ery of alcohol to consumers.251 Striking directly at the "core con­
cerns," Michigan's brief states that "[i]n summary, the principal 
reasons for the structural purpose of Michigan's alcohol distribution 
and licensing system is to ensure an orderly importation and distri­
bution system that helps prevent illegal sales to minors and intoxi­
cated persons and secures the effective collection of Michigan 
taxes. "252 
Critical to Michigan's argument is the discussion of the broad 
power granted by the Twenty-First Amendment. The brief argues 
that North Dakota and the Webb Kenyon Act stand for broad pow­
ers in the hands of the states.253 Michigan points out that 
"[n]othing in the text of the 21st Amendment limits states in how 
they may choose to set up their regulatory framework to deal with 
the transportation, importation, and distribution of alcoholic bever­
ages. Thus, as a textual matter, there can be no justification for 
ignoring the plain and unambiguous command of the 21st 
Amendment. "254 
The brief makes strong arguments against the decision of the 
Sixth Circuit; they state boldly that the court below "erroneously 
248. For purposes of brevity, I have omitted the arguments of the Michigan Beer 
and Wine Wholesalers Association, which are similar to the state's arguments. 
249. Brief for the Petitioners, Granholm v. Heald (No. 03-1116), at 8. 
250. Id. at 9. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 11. 
253. See supra text accompanying note 52; supra text accompanying note 104. 
254. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 249, at 18. 
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dismissed this Court's discussion of the 21st Amendment in North 
Dakota as irrelevant because the case involved the Supremacy 
Clause"255 and that the court "gave insufficient force to the 21st 
Amendment and undue prominence" to Hostetter, Bacchus, and 
Healy.256 Michigan points out that Hostetter and Healy merely hold 
that a state cannot control what happens outside of its borders, and 
that Bacchus was wrongly decided.257 
Instead, the respondent Heald has focused on the economic 
impact on the wine industry, changes implemented by states al­
lowing direct shipment, the impact of the Michigan laws, and the 
discriminatory nature of the Michigan laws.2s8 In their argument, 
respondents state that "[t]his Court's cases make clear that States 
enjoy greater authority over liquor than they do over, say, milk. 
Yet this Court has also consistently invalidated state liquor regula­
tions ... that discriminate against out-of-state commerce."2S9 
In maintaining this argument, the brief focuses on the discrimi­
natory nature of the Michigan laws, and uses the Bacchus case to 
maintain the position that even in light of the Twenty-First Amend­
ment, states may not engage in discriminatory behavior.260 The 
brief argues that the Twenty-First Amendment is not as powerful as 
the state claims it to be, and points out that it "is to be understood 
as a part of the whole Constitution."261 
However, in making this staunch "non-discrimination" argu­
ment, respondents cut against their own hoped-for decision in the 
case. The brief states that "[t]he touchstone of the authority 
granted the States over alcohol by the Twenty-First Amendment is 
evenhandedness toward those in and out of state."262 By making 
this statement, the brief is pointing out a potential pitfall should the 
Court decide to uphold the broad language of § 2 - the Court could 
decide to permit states to ban all direct shipments, in effect, doing 
precisely what the Fourth Circuit did in striking down the discrimi­
nation, but upholding the overall regulatory scheme. 
Respondents' brief continues by discussing Commerce Clause 
analysis in greater detail, making arguments about alternatives to 
255. [d. at 24 (citing Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2003». 
256. [d. at 25. 
257. [d. (emphasis added). 
258. Brief for the Respondents, Granholm v. Heald (No. 03-1116), at 1-9. 
259. [d. at 9. 
260. [d. at 15-16. 
261. [d. at 19. 
262. [d. at 21-22. 
376 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:343 
discriminatory laws, in particular discussing the "core concern" is­
sues of sales to minors, and taxes.263 The brief boldly states that 
"[u]nder the appropriately exacting scrutiny these constitutional 
principles require, Michigan's discriminatory wine shipment laws 
must fall. "264 
2. New York Statutory Scheme 
In the Swedenburg v. Kelly case, the petitioners, Juanita 
Sweden burg et aI, spend the bulk of their brief arguing Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis. They explain that prior to 1970, New 
York permitted some direct-shipments, but this was changed by leg­
islation passed in that year.265 However, there are exemptions al­
lowing in-state wineries to ship directly through certain methods. 
Swedenburg summarizes her argument by pointing out that 
one of the primary purposes of the Commerce Clause is to protect 
"stalwart family farmers" and that as a result, the Court through 
Bacchus has held that the Twenty-First Amendment does not nul­
lify the Commerce Clause and therefore the Court should not now 
change this holding.266 Swedenburg argues that the Second Circuit 
incorrectly found that there was no real discrimination because the 
out-of-state wineries could simply establish an in-state presence and 
therefore be allowed to ship directly to consumers.267 
After first arguing why the discrimination violates the Com­
merce Clause, the brief finally discusses the Twenty-First Amend­
ment. They state that "this Court's precedents all make it clear that 
a state must choose one set of governing rules, not tWO."268 The 
petitioners repeat this argument a short time later in the brief by 
stating that "a state has merely to choose a single set of rules re­
garding direct-shipment and apply them to both domestic and out­
of-state wineries."269 While they imply that they want any such set 
of rules to permit all wineries to ship directly, they neglect to men­
tion in this context that to apply such a holding also would allow the 
states to completely ban direct-shipments, something that would 
not serve the states' interests very well. In discussing the two tier­
analysis rejected by the Court below, they argue that a ruling strik­
263. Id. at 35-47. 
264. Id. at 10. 
265. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 3, Swedenburg v. Kelly (No. 03-1274). 
266. Id. at 10-12. 
267. Id. at 20-21. 
268. Id. at 31. 
269. Id. at 37. 
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ing down the discriminatory powers "would disturb but little the 
state's broad regulatory powers over alcohol distribution."27o 
The New York Respondents' brief271 makes arguments that are 
similar to Michigan's arguments. The summary of their argument is 
simple: 
The plain language of both the Twenty-First Amendment and the 
Webb-Kenyon Act grant states virtually unfettered authority to 
regulate the importation of alcoholic beverages for delivery or 
use within their borders. The legislative history and historical 
context of these provisions makes clear that they were intended 
to shield state regulation from the impediments otherwise posed 
by the dormant Commerce Clause.272 
The respondents back up these statements with discussion of 
the plain language and histories of these two provisions, and discuss 
the Court's cases supporting the position. 
In citing those cases, the brief argues that the Court has read 
the Twenty-First Amendment to permit all "reasonable" regula­
tions promulgated by the states.273 Much like Michigan, the New 
York position on Bacchus is clear: "Bacchus is an anomaly in this 
Court's Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence."274 Still, the brief 
goes on to distinguish Bacchus, arguing that the Hawaiian tax did 
not serve the legitimate purposes of the Twenty-First Amendment, 
but instead was pure protectionism.275 For all the above reasons, 
respondents argue, the New York laws are "fully constitutional. "276 
B. 	 Language and Legislative History of the Twenty-First 
Amendment 
.In evaluating the arguments in these cases, the Court must first 
look to the language of the Twenty-First Amendment and its legis­
lative history in order to determine the constitutionality of the di­
rect-shipment statutory schemes. The Court has done this to 
varying degrees in past decisions, but has never come to any strong 
conclusions. 
270. 	 Id. at 39. 
271. Brief for New York Respondents, Swedenburg v. Kelly (No. 03-1274). For 
purposes of brevity, I have omitted the arguments of the private respondents, which are 
similar to the state's arguments. 
272. 	 Id. at 11. 
273. 	 Id. at 23. 
274. 	 Id. at 28. 
275. 	 Id. 
276. 	 Id. at 12. 
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Out of recent cases, the most comprehensive discussion of the 
Amendment and its legislative history occurred in 324 Liquor 
Corp.277 However, this discussion did not occur in the majority de­
cision authored by Justice Powell and joined by Justices Brennan, 
White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and Scalia.278 Instead, it ap­
peared in the dissent authored by Justice O'Connor and joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist.279 
In her discussion of the Twenty-First Amendment's history, 
Justice O'Connor opened by pointing out that early cases immedi­
ately after the passage of the Amendment "conferred plenary 
power on the States to regulate the liquor trade within their bound­
aries. "280 She then discussed the "thoughtful and powerful dissent" 
of Justice Black in the Hostetter case.281 
Justice Black's dissent in that case focused on the legislative 
history of the Twenty-First Amendment; Justice Black had very 
strong feelings on this matter since he had been a Senator at the 
time of the Amendment's debate in the Senate before its ratifica­
tion. In his dissent, according to O'Connor, "the Senators who ap­
proved the Twenty-First Amendment thought they were returning 
absolute control over the liquor industry to the States" without fed­
eral interference.282 She then discusses much of the debate the Sen­
ators engaged in, concluding that 
[t]he history of the Amendment strongly supports Justice Black's 
view that the Twenty-First Amendment was intended to return 
absolute control of the liquor trade to the States, and that the 
Federal Government could not use its Commerce Clause powers 
to interfere in any manner with the States' exercise of the power 
conferred by the Amendment.283 
Later in the dissent, O'Connor argues that "[ d]espite this clear 
intent, the Court in recent years has used a balancing test to resolve 
277. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy et aI., 479 U.S. 335 (1987) (holding that New 
York's liquor pricing system was not exempted from anti-trust laws and not permissible 
under the Twenty-First Amendment). 
278. Id. at 337. 
279. Id. at 352. 
280. Id. (citing Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939)). See also Finch & Co. 
v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control 
Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939); State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 
U.S. 59 (1936). 
281. 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 353 (citing Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 
377 U.S. 324, 338 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
282. Id. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. 
283. 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 356 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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conflicts between federal statutes and state laws enacted pursuant 
to § 2."284 The proper question, she believed, was not determining 
whether a motivation of the state was linked to a central purpose of 
the Twenty-First Amendment or not, but rather if the provision is a 
result of a power that has been expressly conferred by the 
Constitution.285 
If Justice O'Connor's opinions expressed in this dissent still 
hold true,286 then it would appear that she would engage in the 
more limited analysis undertaken by the Bridenbaugh and 
Swedenburg courts. Likewise, if Chief Justice Rehnquist still agrees 
with her, he may also decide to engage in this limited analysis. It is 
also commonly known that Justices Scalia and Thomas tend to read 
the Constitution from a "textualist" perspective; as a result, they 
too may choose to read the Twenty-First Amendment as permitting 
any intra-state regulation.287 
The only Supreme Court case that is truly "in the way" of a 
broad reading of the Twenty-First Amendment's power is 
Bacchus.288 This case is the only Court precedent where a discrimi­
natory action affecting intra-state regulation under the Twenty-First 
Amendment umbrella was struck down as violative of the Com­
merce Clause. However, it is significant that only three of the cur­
284. Id. at 359 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
285. [d. at 360 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Bacchus Imports, Ltd v. Dias, 
468 U.S. at 287 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
286. It is not improbable that she would extend the same analysis involving a 
Dormant Commerce Clause case. 324 Liquor Corp. involved federal antitrust allega­
tions, which are derived from the Commerce Clause just as the Dormant Commerce 
Clause is. 
287. Justice Scalia has been particularly critical of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis engaged in by the Court, while Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehn­
quist have also raised questions as to the legitimacy and/or state of Dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 
520 U.S. 564, 609 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson 
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175,200 (1995) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment); American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 202 (1990) (Scalia, J., con­
curring in the judgment); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 
662,706 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For further discussion, see also TRIBE, supra 
note 15 §§ 6-2 and 6-6. Of particular interest is the fact that both Justices Scalia and 
Thomas have been highly critical of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, although de­
spite their protests, they usually apply the principles of the analysis. For example, in 
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent that the Dormant Com­
merce Clause is only a mere inference from the Constitution. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 
502 U.S. 437, 469 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Still, both Justices have also been highly 
critical of discriminatory regulations in general. See TRIBE, supra note 15 § 6-6, at 
1063-64 n.24. 
288. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
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rent members of the Court were present at the time of the Bacchus 
decision - Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor. Even more 
critical is that all three dissented in that decision; Justice Stevens 
wrote the dissenting opinion which was joined by the other two Jus­
tices.289 His opinion made it clear that he would not have struck 
down the tax laws "because the wholesalers' Commerce Clause 
claim is squarely foreclosed by the Twenty-First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution."29o The dissent points out that the 
Amendment itself is plain as to allowing states the power to control 
the passage of liquor into the state.291 Justice Stevens cites to the 
numerous cases holding that this regulatory power is broad, and 
"[a]s I read the text of the Amendment, it expressly authorizes this 
sort of burden."292 Although the majority attempts to argue that 
the Amendment was not passed in order to allow economic protec­
tionism of local markets, "[t]his is a totally novel approach to the 
Twenty-First Amendment" and that "the [real] question is whether 
the [statute] in this case is an exercise of a power expressly con­
ferred upon the States by the Constitution. It plainly is."293 
It is therefore not improbable that several members, even a 
plurality or a majority, would end their analysis of the issue with the 
Twenty-First Amendment itself. The legislative history of the 
Twenty-First Amendment is crystal clear - the Amendment was in­
tended to create a narrow exception to the Commerce Clause in the 
area of alcoholic beverages. The Court can, and should, read the 
Amendment this way and thereby maintain the integrity of the 
Amendment itself and by extension the process of amending the 
Constitution.294 However, in order to end its analysis with the 
Amendment itself, the Court would have to overrule, or distinguish 
the one case prohibiting them from doing so - Bacchus. Other than 
Bacchus, all other precedent striking down laws has dealt exclu­
sively with regulation affecting other states.295 
C. The Core Concerns of the Twenty-First Amendment 
Should the Court determine after the direct analysis of the 
289. Id. at 278 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
290. Id. at 279 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
291. Id. at 280 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
292. Id. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
293. Id. at 286-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
294. See Denning, supra note 9, at 341. 
295. See, e.g., Healy v. The Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989); Hostetter v. 
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964). 
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Twenty-First Amendment language and legislative history that the 
Amendment does not explicitly permit the regulation of alcohol by 
the States within their borders under any and all circumstances, the 
Court will likely then look to its prior decisions, and probably focus 
on the "core concerns" it has developed through prior case law. 
In this context, the Court will need to pay particular attention 
to its decisions in Bacchus and North Dakota. This could result in 
an overruling or a strengthening of Bacchus in particular. Bacchus, 
as discussed in Part I of this Note, is the case in which the Court 
held that a state law may prevail over the Commerce Clause if it 
was closely related to the powers granted under the Twenty-First 
Amendment.296 North Dakota elaborated on this holding by estab­
lishing that regulations would be valid if they fell "within the core 
of the State's power under the Twenty-First Amendment" by "pro­
moting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising 
revenue. "297 
The core concerns of the Twenty-First Amendment have been 
an important part of each Circuit's analysis where the laws have 
been found unconstitutional.298 The core concerns that are consist­
ently debated are those for temperance, market regulation, and tax­
ation as outlined in the Bacchus and North Dakota cases.299 
Supreme Court case law does point to these as the "core con­
cerns,"300 but it has never been clearly explained how these "core 
concerns" affect state regulation of alcohol. Specifically, the Court 
needs to address whether or not the core concerns outlined in 
North Dakota are an exclusive list, to what extent state regulations 
must further any core concerns in order to be acceptable, and fi­
nally, what should be done if the regulations do not meet the estab­
lished standard. 
296. See supra Part I. In Bacchus, only three of the current Justices were sitting 
on the Court - Justices Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor. Justice Stevens wrote a 
dissenting opinion in the case, which was joined by both Rehnquist and O'Connor. See 
Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 278 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In North Dakota, where the regula­
tions were upheld, Justice Stevens announced the Court's decision and wrote an opin­
ion which Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist both joined. Justice Scalia 
concurred, and Justice Kennedy dissented. See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 
423 (1990). 
297. North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432. 
298. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 522-24 (6th Cir. 2003); Dickerson v. Bailey, 
336 F.3d 388, 403-04 (5th Cir. 2003); Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 
2003); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1113 (11th Cir. 2002). 
299. See supra note 298. See also North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 423; Bacchus, 468 
U.S. at 263. 
300. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276. 
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Several of the cases at the appeals courts have found that the 
states' discriminatory bans do not further the core concerns of the 
Twenty-First Amendment.3D! In Bainbridge, the Eleventh Circuit 
found that the state did not present sufficient evidence to prove 
that the laws were in furtherance of a core concern.302 The court 
stated that merely presenting a core concern is insufficient.3D3 In­
stead they must present evidence of the interest and "show that its 
statutory scheme is necessary to effectuate the proffered core con­
cern in a way that justifies treating out-of-state firms differently 
from in-state firms."304 
The Fifth Circuit in Dickerson also found that there was insuf­
ficient evidence presented by the state Administrator to connect 
the Texas statute to the core concerns; only conclusory statements 
were presented.305 Heald similarly resulted in a finding of insuffi­
cient evidence by the court, because the defendants did not show 
that the discriminatory laws furthered core concerns.306 
In Beskind, the Fourth Circuit concluded that only the North 
Carolina in-state exception failed to further the core concerns of 
the Twenty-First Amendment.307 The court found that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove that this exception furthered the core 
concerns.30B However, the court established that the legislative his­
tory attached to the laws clearly stated that the statutes were to be 
liberally construed in favor of the regulation and control of alco­
hol.309 Therefore, since the court believed that the combination of 
the original laws and the in-state exception was the problem, and 
not the laws in their entirety, only the offending amendment was 
eliminated.310 The court held that it was "duly bound" to disturb 
"only as much of the. State regulatory scheme as is necessary to en­
force the U.S. Constitution."311 The court further noted that "[a]ny 
further objection to the State's proper exercise of its powers under 
the Twenty-First Amendment must now be taken up directly with 
301. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 526 (6th Cir. 2003); Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 
F.3d 388, 406 (5th Cir. 2003); Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 517 (4th Cir. 2003); 
Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1115 (11th Cir. 2002). 
302. Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1115. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. 
305. Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 406. 
306. Heald, 342 F.3d at 526. 
307. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506,517,519 (4th Cir. 2003). 
308. Id. at 517. 
309. Id. at 519. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. 
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the North Carolina legislature. "312 
Because of the court's decision, the matter was then properly 
taken up by the North Carolina state legislature.313 A new law has 
since been passed allowing all direct-shipments through a licensing 
structure.314 The state acted in conformance with the Twenty-First 
Amendment powers granted to it to regulate alcohol, and has uti­
lized those powers to give consumers what they want - the ability to 
send and receive wine through direct-shipments. Here, the proper 
and fair result has been achieved without the courts overstepping 
their bounds; This presents a constitutional solution that preserves 
the integrity of the Twenty-First Amendment while not completely 
eliminating the federal government's interest in free trade and com­
merce between the states. 
Although this seems to be the best option for the courts to 
follow under a "core concerns" analysis, the Fourth Circuit is the 
only court to have implemented this outcome. For example, the 
court in Heald pointed out that "the relevant inquiry is not whether 
Michigan's three-tier system as a whole promotes the goals," but 
whether the discriminatory scheme specifically promotes the core 
concerns.315 However, the court struck down the entire shipping 
scheme instead of just the offending exception.316 Heald is most 
similar to Bainbridge in that although the court struck down the 
laws as unconstitutional, the primary reason for doing so was for a 
lack of evidence supporting the "core concerns" of the Twenty-First 
Amendment.317 
The Fifth Circuit was not able to find that the core concerns 
were implicated by the statutory construction of the Texas laws be­
cause no evidence had been proffered.318 Further, in Dickerson, 
the Fifth Circuit found that it would be too difficult to take out the 
offending in-state exception from the Texas laws because it was not 
a cleanly inserted amendment like in the North Carolina struc­
ture.319 The Fifth Circuit pointed out that in creating a situation 
with equal treatment, the court could choose to either grant the 
312. Id. at 520. By striking down the in-state exception only, the decision effec­
tively banned all direct-shipments to the state's residents, thus prompting the legislature 
to act. 
313. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1001.1. See supra note 205. 
314. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1001.1. 
315. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 526 (6th Cir. 2003). 
316. Id. at 527. 
317. Id. at 526. 
318. Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 406 (5th Cir. 2003). 
319. Id. at 407-09. 
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same benefits to all, or take away the benefits from all.320 As a 
result, the court decided to grant the same benefits to all, relying on 
a tax case which is unrelated to the present issue.321 The court also 
stated that it would grant the benefit to all because they could not 
just sever the offending portions of the law.322 Doing so would 
have involved "the nullification or enjoined enforcement of many 
statutes that have been in effect for a substantial time" and they 
would have been forced "to act in a legislative capacity."323 
However, in effect, the court acted in a legislative capacity by 
granting the shipping rights to all, which is clearly not what the 
Texas laws intended. The laws were established under the Twenty­
First Amendment, and the court's actions appear to have nullified 
the state's right to act under the Amendment. 
The approach taken by the Bridenbaugh and Swedenburg 
courts is quite different than the above-mentioned courts.324 Al­
though the Second and Seventh Circuits have found it appropriate 
to protect the Twenty-First Amendment rights of the states, they 
have done so in a way that discounts the applicability of the Su­
preme Court's decision in Bacchus.325 They instead choose to look 
exclusively to the Amendment, and not apply the core concerns.326 
The Second Circuit is particularly vehement in its rejection of the 
Bacchus analysis.327 The court said that the analysis was 
"[ r ]egrettably" used in four other Circuit decisions and that it found 
"nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion" that required it to "trans­
pose the resolution of one case into an analytical model for all. "328 
The court later points out that the drafters of § 2 of the Twenty­
First Amendment crafted the section to allow states to circumvent 
the Dormant Commerce Clause.329 
After looking to the analyses utilized by the Courts of Appeals, 
it seems that the courts striking down the shipment laws have taken 
the "core concerns" to a place never intended by the Supreme 
Court - rather than using the core concerns to permit states regula­
320. Id. at 407 (citing Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984». 
321. Heckler, 465 U.S. at 740. 
322. Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 408. 
323. Id. 
324. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 231 (2d Cir. 2004); Bridenbaugh v. Free-
man-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000). 
325. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 236; Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853. 
326. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 231; Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 848. 
327. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 236. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. at 237. 
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tory control under the Twenty-First Amendment, they have in ef­
fect taken it upon themselves to place a burden of proof on the 
states that is so high that the Twenty-First Amendment has lost its 
very soul. As a result, what must happen at this point is that the 
Supreme Court, if it does not choose to overrule Bacchus, should 
establish a standard allowing states broad deference in defending 
laws effectuated under the Twenty-First Amendment. By deferring 
to the states in this way, the Court can uphold the integrity of the 
Twenty-First Amendment without explicitly overruling Bacchus. 
D. A Solution to Balance Constitutional Interests 
The Supreme Court does not routinely overturn its own prece­
dent, and the Court may not do it in this case either; but in reality, 
the Court does not need to explicitly overrule any of its own prece­
dent. Instead, the Court can simply reaffirm its long-standing pre­
cedent and elaborate upon its most recent decisions related to the 
Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce Clause. The Court 
simply has to reaffirm the long-standing principle that the Twenty­
First Amendment granted a broad regulatory power to the states as 
the language and history of the Amendment indicate, and that 
Bacchus was an aberration in the Court's jurisprudence on this mat­
ter. If the Court decides to elaborate on the "core concerns" test 
that has so befuddled the Courts of Appeals, the Court can clarify 
the matter by allowing states broad deference when they invoke the 
core concerns as a defense to their otherwise discriminatory laws. 
Although it is easy to be sympathetic to the plight of wine­
lovers wanting shipments of their favorite bottles at their homes, 
this sympathy should not cloud the constitutional reality that states 
have been granted this power. In this modern era, numerous states 
have taken it upon themselves to change their laws to permit direct­
shipments. This is the critical distinction - the state legislatures are 
the proper forum to make changes in the law, and not in the courts 
by eradicating the Twenty-First Amendment. 
E. Implications of the Court's Decision 
It is critical to understand the implications of the Court's deci­
sion in these cases. First, if the Amendment is read to not grant 
Commerce Clause exceptions, the integrity of the amendment pro­
cess will be compromised. While some believe that the legislative 
history behind the Twenty-First Amendment is not crystal clear, 
legislative histories rarely are. If a broadly phrased constitutional 
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amendment is interpreted in such a restrictive manner as to funda­
mentally undermine the purpose behind its passing in order to sat­
isfy modern sensibilities, any provision of the Constitution is then at 
risk. 
Second, if the Amendment is read by the Court to completely 
restrict trade regulation, the states will lose a very important tool in 
market regulation of a product that is capable of much more harm 
than something as innocuous as a book. There is no question that 
states have a vested interest in regulating intoxicating liquors - this 
is the very cornerstone behind the Amendment. This very issue is 
one of the reasons behind Congress' taking action in the passing of 
the 21st Amendment Enforcement Act - a recognition by Congress 
of the powers granted to the states in alcohol regulation and in giv­
ing them even more control in enforcing that regulation. If the 
Court should not uphold the integrity of the Twenty-First Amend­
ment by permitting the direct-shipment laws to stand, then the 
Amendment will lose its very essence and become nothing more 
than a footnote in constitutional history. 
CONCLUSION 
The integrity behind the Twenty-First Amendment is now in 
the hands of the Supreme Court. In order to uphold the validity of 
the Amendment specifically, and the amendment process generally, 
the Court must uphold the direct-shipment laws by literally reading 
the Twenty-First Amendment, and/or broadly interpreting the 
meaning behind the "core concerns" of the Amendment. Regard­
less of what decision the Court reaches, it is sure to have broad 
ramifications for the wine and liquor industries, state enforcement 
agencies, and consumers. 
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